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In a more and more globalized world we have created unprecedented connectivity, mainly by striving for
better business opportunities. But with such a strong global connectivity, the risks associated have also
changed: formerly local issues can now have global impact, and systems are often too complex to fully
understand their interdependencies. In addition, the speed of change is increasing in many sectors of
society and the economy. So we are building a future world with more and more interdependencies of
which we understand less and less, and this process is accelerating sharply. This means that we are
mixing together the typical ingredients for an upcoming crash, which in the worst case could mean the
collapse of society as we know it. To avoid such a scenario, a coordinated effort of public authorities, civil
society, industry, and academia will be required.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Predictions about the collapse of society are probably as old as
society itself, but only in the last decades has mankind managed to
approach – and sometimes even overstep – the planetary bound-
aries [1,2] in several dimensions, often irreversibly. The scientiﬁc
approach of modeling human societies on the basis predator
(mankind) and prey (planetary resources) [3], also points to the
possibility of a large-scale collapse. We often reassure ourselves by
noting that all the models used are based on assumptions, that
they have many uncertainties, that they only approximate our
highly complex reality. Critical analyses of the limits of modeling
seem to conﬁrm this [4], and we know that technical models
clearly do not take into account our human ingenuity at getting
ourselves out of difﬁculties – but is this reassurance reasonable?
Even the assumption that we can deﬁne our own future within
the planetary boundaries is questioned by critical voices like
Russell [5], warning us against the belief in unlimited growth of
exponential curves, and drawing drastic conclusions about the
future of mankind. Nevertheless, our economic strategies seem to
assume continuously greater efﬁciency in the future and even
faster economic growth with literally no limit.
This method of forecasting future development by extrapola-
tion from the past is risky in two different ways.
Firstly, it does not respect natural limits to growth. These may
arise from the limited availability of resources, or from physicalr Ltd. This is an open access articleboundaries which seemed far away in the past, but now have
come into reach. A good example for the latter is Moore's law [6],
predicting in 1965 a doubling of the maximum number of tran-
sistors in integrated circuits every 12 months. This “law”, adjusted
to 24 months in 1975 and conﬁrmed as ‘not going to stop soon’ in
1995 [7,8], remained valid for some 50 years, but it is now at or
near its limits [9], imposed by several paradigms of fundamental
physics. Although completely new approaches might one day cir-
cumvent some of these limits [10], Moore's law simply cannot
remain valid for another 50 years for integrated circuits as we
currently know them.
Secondly, a prediction based solely on experience from the past
does not foresee unexpected and potentially disruptive events. The
Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011 and the global ﬁnancial crisis
of 2007–08 are prominent examples of sudden events ending
high-ﬂying hopes for controlled risk in energy supply or ever-in-
creasing economic proﬁts, respectively.
Looking at the large number of fascinating growth stories from
sources like digital industries, Chinese GDP, or investment banking
proﬁts, we tend to forget about the fate of the stars from the past
when they reached their limits: US automotive industries, Cana-
dian and European cell phone producers or Japanese efﬁciency
champions all have in common that they could not maintain their
excellent growth rates for eternity. We need to pay attention to the
limits of growth very carefully when looking at the long-term
resilience of our global society.under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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We will show that globalization and the digital revolution have
led to more interdependencies, higher complexity and rapid ac-
celeration of change in most sectors of our societies and econo-
mies. For this reason, the long-term resilience of a nation, a region
or an industry cannot be considered any more as a conﬁned matter
that has little to do with the global environment.
We will demonstrate by several examples from the recent years
that interconnection, complexity and acceleration thereof as in-
gredients of globalization and digitization have increased the risk
of major shocks, propagating not only inside but also across in-
dividual sectors, and to society as a whole. We will show that there
are strategies to limit this risk but also show that these strategies
could not have been implemented successfully so far in our cur-
rent economically driven environment.
During the discussion we will look at two important concepts
which are relevant to resilience, but are not at the center of the
attention of our growth-oriented efforts today: fairness, which is
important to avoid tensions within societies, and risk transfer,
which in many examples seems to ﬂow from the better-informed
expert stakeholders to the less-informed parts of our society.
We make a number of suggestions as to how science can sup-
port policy decisions in a highly complex world. We also propose a
radically different pattern of business incentives, aimed at taking
some steps towards improving fairness, at decoupling economic
growth from consumption and above all at making risk-taking at
someone else's expense less attractive.3. Methods
Although there is abundant literature about resilience, sus-
tainability and risk, there are very few scientiﬁc discussions of
hyper-complex issues spanning multiple sectors of our societies,
policies and economies. The notion of so-called post-normal sci-
ence, introduced by Funtowicz and Ravetz [11], is a step in the
direction of understanding complex systems at the borderline
between science and policy, but it only gives theoretical backing
rather than direct guidance. More on the practical side, Taleb [12]
provides many important examples, including valuable con-
siderations on the human inability to assess risks correctly in
complex environments. The issue of the human mind often being
misled is also underlined by Spiegelhalter [13], showcasing several
disruptive events with economic or health impact.
Because resilience and sustainability are typically discussed in
communities focused on the business perspective (such as re-in-
surance companies), at the national level (governments), or in a
particular community (e.g. the civil protection community), there
is no obvious forum for a broader scale discussion at supranational
level, connecting economic, political and societal dimensions.
We started such a dialog on the work of the European Com-
mission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), when around 2012 we rea-
lized that the typical crisis management activities are related to
civil protection, but the predominant crisis of these years was the
ﬁnancial crisis, in which the JRC was performing completely dif-
ferent activities such as modeling the probabilities of bank failure
or assessing the trends and issues in public ﬁnances of Eurozone
Member States. From the idea of resilience cutting across sectors
and being relevant in many places, we identiﬁed many sectors in
society, policy and economy where resilience matters, and docu-
mented them in an overview report [14]. In a series of related
workshops and conferences we discussed the facets of resilience
with the stakeholder community and gathered valuable insights.
In a 2014 workshop on 'Thinking the impossible' at the JRC in Is-
pra, Italy, we looked at risks that sound highly unlikely but couldbe devastating. At the Global Risk Forum 2014 in Davos we ran a
dedicated session on risks across sectors of society. At the Eur-
opean Climate Foundation in Brussels early 2015 we followed up
on the matter, and at a big conference of the European Commis-
sion in September 2015 (also in Brussels) we had a plenary pre-
sentation on resilience, complexity and risk across sectors of so-
ciety. Finally, in joint session of the International Council of Sci-
ence (ICSU) and the JRC at the World Science Forum of November
2015 in Budapest we discussed resilience in a changing world. The
ﬁndings and conclusions of these workshops and conferences are
presented in this article.4. Results
4.1. Increased dependencies across sectors
Crises can spread globally, and in our modern world they can
easily also impact business sectors that at ﬁrst glance do not seem
exposed. In the following section we will show examples of how
effects can hop from the digital world into the ﬁnance sector, from
ﬁnance to government, on to geopolitics, to energy and ﬁnally to
societal stability. The related damage in each hop amounts to
several billions. Although the examples listed are not connected, in
the future we might see cross-sector cascading effects.
4.1.1. From digital to ﬁnance
In the digital world, computer viruses can cause damages in the
millions, but these damages are usually distributed over a very
large number of users and businesses. Other digital risks strike
more centrally: high-speed trading algorithms, making autono-
mous decisions at the stock exchanges in milliseconds, caused the
so-called ﬂash crashes at the New York Stock exchange in 2010 and
at the Singapore stock exchange in October 2013, with the latter
reportedly wiping out 6.9bn USD [15]. It took more than four
months to analyze the reasons behind the 15-min New York crash,
and the report by the US authorities came to the conclusion that
there was no clearly identiﬁable root cause that sparked the crash.
They considered the events 'an important reminder of the inter-
connectedness of our derivatives and securities markets' and stated
that they 'clearly demonstrate the importance of data in today's
world of fully-automated trading strategies and systems' [16]. Al-
though many stocks rebounded right after the dip, the reaction of
software algorithms could easily have ruined companies, and in
Singapore some stocks lost 87% of their value. Safeguards were
consequently installed in the systems of the stock exchanges, but
other unpleasant and new surprises might come from different
directions: high-frequency trading, for instance, can be vulnerable
to the effects of solar storms [17], but not all ﬁnancial institutions
are aware of these very indirect effects: originating on the surface
of the sun, solar outbreaks can create electromagnetic dis-
turbances strong enough to take out the GPS signal, which is
widely used for time synchronization in ﬁnancial trading.
4.1.2. Financial to economic
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, a major shock
went through the US banking system. Not only the US housing
market had gone sour, but credit default swaps had been spread all
over the globe – and a cascade of repackaged and distributed risk
started, jumping the Atlantic Ocean easily and hitting EU banks.
Some of these were hit so hard that they had to be bailed out by
their governments, so the risk continued in the governments.
Some EU governments needed central support, and the EU used
the opportunity to overhaul its ﬁnancial system. Nevertheless, the
governments of eleven EU Member States resigned or were ousted
over the crisis, some of them several times (Latvia and the Czech
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Romania, the Netherlands, and Italy again in 2012, Slovenia in
2013, Italy a third time and France in 2014 and Portugal in 2015).
The link between the US banking sector and EU government
stability is obvious in hindsight, but very few if any observers had
noted it before 2007.
More obvious is the link from government to geopolitics. The
Arab Spring gave rise to unstructured power relations and laid the
ground for extremism and radicalism. Ukraine's attempt to sign an
association agreement with the EU led to massive demonstrations
and a regional political crisis, including a (civil) war. The civil war
in Syria, ongoing since more than ﬁve years, has destroyed stabi-
lity and economy in the region. And we recently saw in the gas
supply discussions between Russia, Ukraine and the EU that geo-
politics links to energy. It took a well-prepared last-minute effort
to conclude a gas supply deal, which ﬁnally was agreed only
shortly before winter, during the last days of October 2014.
4.1.3. Energy to society
Energy is at the core of the economic development of many
countries, and the power grid has become an indispensable critical
infrastructure. A ﬁctional but well-researched scenario on what
the world would look like after a widespread collapse of the power
grid is available in the book by Elsberg [18]. Elsberg considers an
IT-based collapse, but that is not the only hazard to the power
grid: several reports and studies on severe space weather suggest
that this too could cause major damage, up to USD 2.6 trillion in
the ﬁrst year in the US alone [19,20]. In addition, energy has an
obvious relation to climate policies, to the real economy and even
to digital processes: modern computing centers depend on energy
availability, and new digital concepts like the blockchain [21] of
the bitcoin currency even exploit the obstacle of not being able to
calculate highly complex matters without consuming signiﬁcant
energy [22].
There are numerous other examples where sectors that were
reasonably independent in the past are now coupled across the
globe. E. coli contaminated food traveled all across Europe. Pan-
demics like SARS or bird ﬂu spread through intercontinental tra-
velers. Ebola cases were spread by infected passengers from Africa
to Europe and to the US; the disease was only contained through a
major international initiative.
All these examples show clearly that not only has the inter-
relation between sectors increased, but also the complexity of in-
terdependencies in ﬁnancial markets, of energy grids, of high-
speed trading algorithms, of the food chains, of environmental
changes and of global travel has grown hugely. Indeed, in many
cases we only perceive these interdependencies after a major
perturbation, and there is no agreement on what body or in-
stitution has the responsibility for identifying, monitoring, and
controlling the risks created.
The context of change is formally given a global perspective by
the Global Risks Report 2016 [23], which draws attention to ways
global risks could evolve and interact in the next decade. The top
ﬁve global risks in terms of likelihood are ranked to be: 1. large-
scale involuntary migration; 2. extreme weather events; 3. failure
of climate change mitigation and adaptation; 4. interstate conﬂict
with regional consequences; and 5. major natural catastrophes.
The report's Global Risks Interconnectedness Map 2016 shows
strong interconnections across sectors, e.g. between environ-
mental and societal risks (failure on climate change and water
crises), but also across societal, geopolitical and economic risks
(with strong links from state collapse to migration and between
social instability and unemployment).4.2. Increased complexity of systems and processes
The ﬁnancial crisis has brought to our attention that the
lending relations in the interbanking market have become highly
complex [24], which decreases systemic resilience. Haldane and
May [25] identify modularity as a key feature for the topology of a
stable ﬁnancial system, as it helps limit contagion. Typically, one
would expect that a good connectivity in ﬁnancial networks allows
for a sound distribution of risk, but Battiston et al. [26] have shown
that in the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator (which we clearly
had in the ﬁnancial crisis, where the robustness of an entity was
strongly assessed on the basis of its past trend) this only holds
until a certain threshold is reached. Over the threshold, additional
connectivity turns counterproductive and creates a pernicious
feedback loop, increasing individual and systemic risk.
The situation during the ﬁnancial crisis was even worse than
that depicted by the theoretical approaches. Little was known
about the real connectivity in the banking system. Rumors about
new candidates for bankruptcy were traveling fast, and the biggest
unanswered question about the distribution of debt was literally:
'Where is the money?' In addition, banks were rushing to pass on
questionable debt for as long as it was still possible, creating a
dynamism which could not be controlled easily. The failure to
understand the complexity of the market is perhaps depicted most
prominently by the fact that the German KfW Bank transferred
320 million Euros to Lehman on Monday, September 15th, 2008,
the very day Lehman collapsed. Luckily for the KfW, the majority
of the sum was recovered later [27].
But the ﬁnancial markets are just one example of a sector that
has become so complex that we simply do not understand it
anymore. The fact that we have also lost track of the details of our
food chain became obvious when in 2011 the European E. coli
bacteria outbreak caused several fatalities in Germany and beyond,
and a frantic search for the origin started. Due to the precautionary
principle, also suspect traces had to be addressed, resulting in
Spanish cucumbers being wrongly identiﬁed as contaminated
with E. coli. This led to reported weekly Spanish losses of 200
million Euros [28] due to the decline in consumer trust, whereas
ﬁnally bean sprouts of completely different origin were identiﬁed
as the root cause for the E. coli outbreak, although even this was
contested. The issue showed how little we know about the origin
and stopovers of our food.
Another less damaging but unexpected complexity could be
observed after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, when Ford Motors
in the US and other international car makers could no longer
produce models in a particular metallized black [29] due to a
shortage in the Xirallics pigment, produced by Merck plant near
Fukushima, which had been affected by the catastrophe. (Note that
strong impact from Fukushima also arrived on the other side of the
planet, when the German government issued its Energiewende
policy to abandon nuclear power as a consequence of the disaster
in Japan.) This example shows that it is not only in the food sector
that the complexity of supply chains has grown beyond our
comprehension.
The power grid is another infrastructure which has become so
complex that we do not fully understand it anymore. On 4 No-
vember 2006, the cruise ship Norwegian Pearl was planned to
make its way on the German river Ems to the North Sea, requiring
a shutdown of a 380 kV power line across the river for safety
reasons. Although a routine operation, this shutdown resulted in
cascading effects all across Europe, leaving an estimated 15 million
households in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal
without power for more than an hour [30].
These examples show that our technologically driven world has
developed structures and processes that cannot be fully under-
stood or easily modeled anymore. Even if we had the time to
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moving on, and complexity is added on a daily basis. In a com-
petitive world with tightly fought margins we cannot expect the
complex processes to be stable over time. The opposite is true: the
speed of change is even increasing in many domains.
4.3. Acceleration of interconnectedness and complexity
The exponential growth of Moore's law has boosted perfor-
mance and minimized the size of microelectronics. The availability
of ever smaller and more powerful digital technologies has also
accelerated other areas such as climate modeling, agriculture, in-
dustry automation, material sciences, genetics, economic assess-
ment, ﬁnance, transport, construction and many other sectors. In
addition, modern information technology has created a wealth of
business opportunities for the digital economy. Smartphones put
the information of the internet at our ﬁngertips, social networks
arose, satellite navigation systems helped with orientation and
timing, digital imaging and new sensors gave us a better picture of
the world, and all of these results can be joined into what we call
big data. In December 2015 the international science community,
Science International, published a joint statement, on Open Data in
a Big Data World: An international accord [31]. They identiﬁed the
opportunities and challenges of the data revolution as today's
predominant issue for global science policy and proposed some
fundamental principles, noting that the scientiﬁc community has a
distinctive voice.
The acceleration of all of these sectors has also changed many
business models, which has two negative consequences for the
resilience of modern society. Firstly, there is a stronger de-
pendency of almost all of the processes of our daily life on very
few players, and secondly – though associated to the ﬁrst effect –
we can observe a more and more uneven distribution of proﬁts,
leading to tensions in societies.
Dependency has been created by new concepts such as In-
formation as a Service (IaaS) or Software as a Service (SaaS),
binding customers to suppliers in a far stronger way than the
traditional model of producing and selling. Ten years ago we
would buy a CD and own it, whereas today we need to sign up to
music platforms which provide us with the desired content – and
monitor our behavior continuously. The associated business
models are pushing into other sectors of industry. Traditional
companies in the automotive sector have to face competition from
IT companies developing autonomous driving, thereby harvesting
even more data. E-books are so convenient that hardcover and
paperback revenues are sharply declining, non-digital photo-
graphy has almost disappeared and smart phone apps are repla-
cing travel agencies and taxi companies. This digital acceleration
might be creating more choices for the customer, but comes at the
price of dependency on very few digital players.
In addition to this dependency, which is detrimental to resi-
lience, there is a mid-term issue with wealth distribution: the
agreed measure for macroeconomic growth is still GDP, which
does not contain any fairness component. So we are striving for
economic growth, sometimes also for inclusive growth, but not
necessarily for a fair distribution of growth. An example illustrates
the differences: from 2007–2015, a period covering the ﬁnancial
crisis, the OECD countries on average experienced moderate
growth in terms of GDP [32], but the general aggregate is not
telling a lot. The GDP per capita of different countries developed
quite differently, and in 2015 Germany and Greece were at 107.65%
and 76.75% of their 2007 values, respectively. This created sig-
niﬁcant political tensions, and is not expressed in monitoring the
aggregate OECD total (which is 106.45%).
But the problem also exists at national level: the majority of EU
households might not agree on having experienced any economicgrowth since 2007, but would rather recall austerity measures,
income cuts, and tax increases. The growth measured must
therefore have arrived in other places – but we do not have de-
tailed, up-to-date statistics on this. Some evidence originates from
a study [33] of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2013, com-
paring the mean and the median values of household wealth in the
Eurozone and coming to the conclusion that fairness has suffered.
Germany's households, for example, are on average (mean) com-
parably well-off, but the difference between the mean household
wealth and the median one is the largest in Europe, indicating
signiﬁcant unfairness in the detailed distribution. A very clear
analysis of the ECB study can be found in [34]. In addition to po-
tential tensions in society, the risky business models leading to
uneven distribution are undermining resilience even further. We
were reminded during the ﬁnancial crisis that our modern world is
targeted at short-term proﬁt, possibly at the expense of the sys-
tem, and that governments have to intervene if society is not to
end up paying the price of excessive risk taking by comparably few
market players.. This strategy of leaving behind the risk for the
bank (or afterwards for the government and for society) should
have been known well since February 1995, when Barings Bank,
the oldest UK merchant bank, was brought down by a single rogue
trader [35]. But in a ﬁerce global competition every penny counts,
and we cannot expect our job-creating entrepreneurs to give way
to competitors for fairness's sake. Production lines of companies
are transferred for proﬁtability reasons from Central Europe to
Eastern Europe, later to China and from there to Vietnam. Do-
mestic jobs are lost and costs are being saved, while dependencies
rise and unfairness increases. So a certain share of the digital re-
volution may just be a silent conversion of thousands of jobs into
an enormous cash ﬂow towards the few big digital shareholders.
The evolution of wealth distribution in the US is very telling, and
the perceived rule of billionaires has even been exploited with
some success by Bernie Sanders in his 2016 US presidential can-
didature campaign for the Democrats.
Europe also needs to monitor its trends very carefully. The si-
tuation of many young Greek graduates without a job, in combi-
nation with loopholes for the wealthy in the national tax regime
(or its enforcement) has already created massive tensions, led to
government changes and to discussions with EU partners, put
pressure on EU solidarity and weakened EU resilience during the
ﬁnancial crisis.5. Discussion
5.1. Current situation
When analyzing the resilience of our modern and complex
society, we start from the UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk
Reduction [36], deﬁning resilience as 'The ability of a system,
community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accom-
modate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and
efﬁcient manner, including through the preservation and restoration
of its essential basic structures and functions.' The United Nations’
deﬁnition has an important addendum, expressed by the following
note:
'Resilience means the ability to “resile from” or “spring back from”
a shock. The resilience of a community in respect to potential hazard
events is determined by the degree to which the community has the
necessary resources and is capable of organizing itself both prior to
and during times of need'. This notion of springing back from a
shock is nicely expressed as 'Why things bounce back' by Zolli and
Healy [37], who formally deﬁne resilience as 'the capacity of a
system, enterprise, or a person to maintain its core purpose and in-
tegrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances'. For a
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change we are exposed to and our capability to cope with it.
Are we already living in dramatically changed circumstances,
are dramatic changes just ahead of us, or will there be a dramatic
change only at a more distant point in the future? Comparing the
world of today with the world in the late 1980s, we can see huge
differences, e.g. in globalization and in digitization, but there are
also many areas that have remained comparably stable, such as
peace in Central Europe, the economically strong position of the
US, the mechanisms of the United Nations, or the simple fact that
the majority of our cars still run on four wheels and are fueled by
hydrocarbons. Dramatic changes there have been, but often not
arriving with a big bang, but silently inserting themselves into our
daily lives (e.g. the internet). The process is continuing and
accelerating.
Our capacity to 'bounce back' – or more formally to cope with
dramatic change – is also difﬁcult to assess. There is no formally
agreed measure for resilience that could serve as a benchmark, but
we have created powerful political processes to cope with change
globally, such as the Sustainable Development Goals [38], the Paris
Climate Agreement [39], or the global Sendai Framework for Dis-
aster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 [40]. The latter includes in its
Priorities for Disaster Risk Reduction, the statement 'Enhancing
disaster preparedness for effective response, and to ‘Build Back
Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction'. The Sendai
Conference included a session on Disaster Risk in the Financial
System which concluded that, by 2020, 1-in-100 and 1-in-20 risk
analyses should be developed to enable the understanding of le-
vels of resilience across all capital and support the adoption of
standards by global regulators. These international agreements
were all made in 2015 but it is notable that all of these instru-
ments and procedures were the culmination of decades of work.
The Paris agreement (called COP21 because it was signed at the
21st annual meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the
UNFCCC) was preceded by the Kyoto [41] climate agreement of
1997 and its Doha amendment [42] of 2012. The Sendai Frame-
work was preceded by the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action [43].
The sustainable development goals were preceded by the original
Millennium Development Goals [44] of 2000. Altogether, the in-
ternational community has been working on resilience for at least
20 years in quite a determined way.
Nevertheless, while global agreements on resilience and sus-
tainability have been concluded over the last 20 years, the ex-
ploitation of resources has continued, and our remaining planetary
reserve has been depleted more and more. Signiﬁcant economic
development took place and growth was achieved in many regions
of the world, including places like China, Brazil, India and South
Africa, the OPEC countries, Southeast Asia, but also in Europe,
Australia and in North America. However, much of this growth was
accompanied by massive exploitation of natural resources, often
associated with major catastrophes. Offshore drilling created dis-
asters like the Deepwater Horizon incident with an estimated set-
tlement of approximately $7.8bn [45]. Massive irrigation caused a
signiﬁcant loss of natural water reservoirs and dried out the Aral
Sea [46], and biodiversity is decreasing at a speed that made
Chapin et al. [47] request the establishment of a new international
body to assess changes in biodiversity already in 2000. Our com-
plex technology has created nuclear incidents with global impact,
such as the Fukushima meltdown in 2011. Even our technological
progress in successfully exploring space has left so much space
debris behind that it will jeopardize the success of future missions,
and Hall states in [48] '… the space community is realizing that the
failure to solve the problem would be disastrous.'.
The role of media in these changes is complex, but important.
On the one hand the mass media, often powered by an explicit
political agenda, can choose to sensationalise some aspects ofglobal risks while concealing others, thereby aggravating the
problem and making it more difﬁcult for society to ﬁnd solutions;
on the other hand the media – especially modern social media –
can create awareness and encourage solutions. In modern
democracies there should be no compromise with the principles of
free speech, even where the effect may be destructive; but re-
sponsible media leaders, journalists and other commentators can
be encouraged to understand the risks and help towards mitigat-
ing them.
Other important factors are known but cannot be reliably
predicted: the geopolitical power balance, the strength of the in-
ﬂuence of supranational organizations and institutions, or the
power of the civil society play an important role when assessing
the risk of societal collapse. The authors acknowledge that these
factors – as well as other drivers such as cultural, religious or
historical developments – should be considered in a comprehen-
sive assessment but go beyond the scope of this article.
5.2. Key questions
Starting from the above deﬁnitions, the key questions when
looking at the resilience of our current societies are (i) how much
ﬂexibility do we have left, and (ii) how can we carry on from today.
It seems particularly with regards to global energy needs that
whatever coping capacity is left on our planet (e.g. shale gas or
nuclear fusion energy) will either be exhausted very soon or
contribute to a further acceleration of the negative effects.
Therefore, unless we can decouple growth from the use of re-
sources, we are heading for, at worst, a crash, or at best an un-
pleasant downward spiral, even though currently the slope is still
pointing up. Ehrlich [49] concludes that our modern society has a
different risk of collapse than former societies which collapsed
locally or regionally only. He claims that complex, multi-level
systems may be better able to cope with complex, multi-level
problems, but we fear that this statement only holds up to a point
where the complexity of systems itself becomes an additional risk.
Carrying on from today is even more difﬁcult. Our short-term
thinking often limits our vision to the next few years, and although
we could still change course, we rather exercise ourselves in denial
and promises of continuous and never-ending growth, missing the
point that even the growth we are experiencing today is more and
more unfair and therefore already eroding our social solidarity
and, as a consequence, our resilience. Diamond [50] has analyzed
the differences between today's dangers and the dangers that past
societies faced, and identiﬁed twelve main problems speciﬁc to the
world of today, including inequality. He also researched why many
of the formerly ruling societies failed to recognize that big pro-
blems were looming up before they fell, and concludes that this
reﬂex of denial has not changed over the centuries.
We enjoy the speed and acceleration – but can we distinguish
between the thrust of the engine and the free fall as we go over
the cliff? Currently we simply try to outperform each other on
speed, and leave it at that.
The interconnectedness, complexity and acceleration of our
modern society have brought us to the limits of exponential
growth and have simultaneously exhausted the resources of the
planet in several dimensions, weakening our resilience. To capi-
talize on what is left of it, a major rethink in society is required. In
a ﬁerce global competition such reconsideration will clearly not
happen on its own, but needs to be accomplished by the right
incentives to avoid unnecessary interconnectedness, reduce sys-
temic complexity and slow down an acceleration that cannot be
maintained forever anyway.
But how can we achieve this? Key elements for accomplishing
this challenge will be decoupling growth from consumption, in-
troducing more fairness into the system and identifying and
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of risk in our complex systems, especially if there is a risk of major
systemic failure. In addition, we need to prevent the transfer of
systemic risk to less knowledgeable stakeholders (the general
public, the taxpayer, etc.) not connected with the original trans-
action in which the risk was created.
5.3. Suggestions for a way ahead
We therefore suggest three initiatives to lay the ground for an
economy and society aiming at sustainable wealth rather than
chasing for unrealistic never-ending growth, turning from a con-
tinued depletion of resources to a resilient continuum. The in-
itiatives are not meant to suffocate or kill the economy but to
move it rapidly from a destructive and short-term mode to a long-
term healthy equilibrium. This might sound ambitious, and might
be perceived as threatening by the homo economicus of our mod-
ern days, but any proﬁt-oriented activity has long had to consider
political side constraints, and moving the incentives to different
objectives will only regulate markets in the desired direction, not
abolish them or move to socialism.
History shows that with the right incentives a single human
generation is sufﬁcient not only to turn the mindset of modern
society but also to create a highly competitive technology position
in the markets. Between 1970 and 2000, environmental thinking
in Europe and in the US was fostered by regulators, civil society
and industry altogether, and created new markets and green
growth to the beneﬁt of nature.
Another example, still ongoing, is the global effort on CO2-re-
duction and climate change agreements, which started roughly 15
years ago and has made signiﬁcant progress with the COP21
agreement of 2015.
Science will have to play an important role in this respect, and a
number of international initiatives with scientiﬁc involvement
have already been started in the related area of sustainability. The
International Council for Science (ICSU), UN agency partners and
other non-governmental organizations including the International
Social Sciences Council, Sustainable Development Solutions Net-
work and Science and Technology in Society Forum, with the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as
an observer, have created a new global research program Future
Earth: Research for Global Sustainability [51]. The goal is to provide
the knowledge required for societies in the world to face risks
posed by global environmental change and to seize opportunities
in a transition to global sustainability.
The Integrated Research on Disaster Risk Programme (IRDR) [52]
(focusing on 'natural' hazards) is another approach to research on
disaster risk through an international, multidisciplinary (natural,
health, engineering and social sciences) collaborative programme.
The Program has created IRDR International Centres of Excellence
such as one on Vulnerability and Resilience Metrics and another
on Disaster Resilient Homes, Buildings and Public Infrastructure.
Another newly-started research programme, recognizing the
importance of the urban scene and health is Urban Health and
Wellbeing [53], which is an interdisciplinary research effort whose
overall aim is to generate policy-relevant knowledge that will
improve health status, reduce health inequalities and enhance the
well-being of urban dwellers. It will focus on systems approaches
to address the complexity of urban issues and their inﬂuence on
health.
The International Council for Science is working with UN
agencies to bring together the science from these three interna-
tional research programs in an integrated way to provide advice to
the Climate Convention, the Sendai Agreement, the Sustainable
Development Goals and other international issues.
The next thirty years should be sufﬁcient time to instill asustainability and resilience philosophy into policies, civil society
and the economy – turning from unfair growth to healthy growth.
The start of any such initiative could even bring direct economic
beneﬁts: The World Business Council for Sustainable Development
identiﬁed signiﬁcant business opportunities in sustainability, and
underlines the importance of being ﬁrst in the green race [54], and
ﬁrst business models in creating a sustainable future have already
emerged [55]. This means we have arrived at a point where not
acting might make us fall behind. With the right political, eco-
nomic and societal incentives, resilience will pay off, whereby it
will no longer be economically viable to go for extreme risks (as
the consequences could not be passed on to others).
The following three suggestions by the authors are meant to
support a sustainable and resilient society, and are derived from
the analysis above:
(1) Cut down interdependencies by putting incentives to avoid
business models which
– create unnecessary global interdependencies,
– do not create local jobs (or no jobs at all),
– force people to move,
– limit customer choices and ﬂexibility without a need,
– exploit the weakest parts of society.
(2) Reduce complexity by putting incentives to avoid business
models which
– create unnecessarily complex procedures,
– transfer risk into remote places, to the taxpayer, or to less
knowledgeable parties
– gamble on rights not being enforceable,
– exploit taxation loopholes or taxation enforcement weaknesses.
(3) Stop the acceleration of interconnectivity and complexity by
putting strong economic incentives for simple business models
creating local or community beneﬁt.
Research can make a major contribution to setting the right
incentives, as nowadays many traditional concepts are not ﬁt for
purpose, and new ways of measuring resilience, fairness and
sustainability need to be established. We therefore suggest de-
veloping a scientiﬁcally solid measure for fair GDP (FGDP) as an
internationally acknowledged benchmark for growth to avoid ex-
treme inequality and tension in societies. In addition, initiatives to
measure resilience of societies in their multidimensional facets,
trying to identify drivers of fragility as well as tipping points for
slowly increasing instability, are recommended.6. Conclusion
The world has come to an unprecedented status of inter-
connectedness and complexity, both growing at an enormous
speed, and it urgently requires a transition from short-term
thinking to sustainable resilience. Such a change needs to be
triggered by the right political, economic and societal incentives.
There are clear ways ahead, but they need to be accompanied by
organized support from the stakeholder groups involved.
It will require a joint effort of public authorities, civil society,
industry, and academia to lead the global transition towards a
resilient society, offering fair long-term growth in a healthy and
sustainable societal equilibrium.Acknowledgments
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